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Abstract 
Honeypots are computing systems used to capture unauthorized, often malicious, activity. While 
honeypots can take on a variety of forms, researchers agree the technology is useful for studying 
adversary behavior, tools, and techniques. Unfortunately, researchers also agree honeypots are 
difficult to implement and maintain. A lack of measures of effectiveness compounds the 
implementation issues specifically. In other words, existing research does not provide a set of 
measures to determine if a honeypot is effective in its implementation. This is problematic 
because an ineffective implementation may lead to poor performance, inadequate emulation of 
legitimate services, or even premature discovery by an adversary. Accordingly, we have 
developed a taxonomy for measures of effectiveness in dynamic honeypot implementations. Our 
aim is for these measures to be used to quantify a dynamic honeypot's effectiveness in 
fingerprinting its environment, capturing valid data from adversaries, deceiving adversaries, and 
intelligently monitoring itself and its surroundings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is not a surprise that as the number of network-based computing services increases within 
globalized cyberspace, the breadth of cybersecurity attacks and frequency of breaches increase 
likewise. For example, there was a 56% increase in web-based attacks in 2018 [1]. Ransomware 
infections rose by 12% in the same period [1]. Overall, systems were attacked roughly every 40 
seconds [2]. Perhaps these trends continue year after year because researchers and cybersecurity 
professionals have a broad understanding of what constitutes a specific type of attack but details 
of adversary behavior within a system are overshadowed by the need to simply defend.  
 
With that said, one type of technology that can be used to study adversary interactions is 
honeypots. Honeypots attract adversaries by emulating operating systems, applications, and 
services with known vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, honeypots are extremely difficult to 
implement and maintain [4][5]. Dynamic honeypots are specifically problematic in this manner 
[6]. In fact, existing literature contains a plethora of suggestions as to how dynamic honeypots 
can be effectively deployed or managed. However, there is little quantitative validation of 
effectiveness in this regard which leaves professionals, researchers, and educators without the 
means to differentiate between implementation or management modalities. 
 
Accordingly, this work presents a taxonomy for dynamic honeypot measures of effectiveness. 
The aim was to codify what features are common across dynamic honeypots into an actionable 
knowledge model. The significance of doing so rests in providing a quantitative means to 
determine whether a given dynamic honeypot is functioning within operational guidelines. 
However, before delving into how we developed our taxonomy of the presentation and details of 
the taxonomy, it will be helpful to discuss the background and motivation for this work.  
 
2. Background 
The relevant background for this work includes honeypot technology, measures of effectiveness, 
and taxonomies. We provide these discussions with the goal of contextualizing both the 
motivation for our study as well as the results. Accordingly, each background section presents a 
summary snapshot of existing research which we have curated with that goal in mind.  
 
2.1 Honeypots 
A honeypot is a computing system intended to attract adversaries and designed to be attacked 
[7]. Honeypots are qualitatively categorized with traits such as interaction level, deployment 
modes, and deployment categories to place them into four types being: shadow honeypots, 
honeynets, honeyfarms, and honeytokens [8]. Other recent research showcases various deceptive 
technologies and countermeasures to honeypot technology [9]. Building off this idea of 
deception, approaches were created to increase the deceptive nature of honeypot deployments 
through five methods [10]. Foremost amongst modern innovation in honeypots, researchers [11] 
have started to fuse machine learning and honeypot technology. 
 
2.2 Measures of Effectiveness 
A measure of effectiveness (MoE) can be described as a measure of performance which 
corresponds to a specific user requirement [12]. Thus, a MoE is typically used to assess whether 
a specific tool or service accomplishes its task. By defining the MoE for honeypots, we were able 
to expand an existing taxonomy [13] so that metrics could be created to assess and compare 
honeypot effectiveness. In the context of this study, such an ability to quantitatively assess and 
compare honeypots with our MoE satisfies the research question. For our purposes, we needed to 
determine user requirements for our honeypots. Specifically, we were able to determine that 
fingerprinting, data capture, deception, and intelligence are suitable MoE. 
 
2.3 Taxonomies 
For clarity, we take a taxonomy to be a classification of classes with values to which objects of 
the study are mapped based on the object’s characteristics” [13]. There are two types of 
taxonomies that can be used in classification, being faceted and enumerative [13][14]. 
Importantly, a taxonomy utilizes a set of semantically cohesive categories that are combined as 
needed to create an expression of a concept [14]. For our purposes, we needed to utilize an 
enumerative taxonomy to incorporate our measures of effectiveness as cohesive and discrete 
categories. From this established taxonomy, we then created a hierarchical classification to 
categorize the honeypots [15]. 
 
 
3. Method 
The motivation for this work is best expressed through a single research question: what, if any, 
existing features of dynamic honeypots can be used to model a set of measures of effectiveness. 
We developed this question based on the observation that existing literature acknowledged the 
problem of configuring and maintaining dynamic honeypots, and further existing literature 
asserts potential workarounds, there appeared to be no discussion as to how to measure whether a 
given honeypot was functioning as intended. Further, our preliminary work [16] was well 
received and thus prompted continued investigation. Therefore, the next logical step then was to 
construct a full, representative MoE model. The hope is that later work may transition our 
conceptual model into a practical tool. 
 
3.1 Design 
The first course of action to enable our work was to select a research design. Here, we 
considered grounded theory. However, we did not intend to produce theory or theoretical 
models. We also considered ontology. However, established conceptual frameworks for both 
honeypot and measures of effectiveness knowledge domains already exist. Ultimately, we 
determined an exploratory design using literature analysis would be the most appropriate to 
facilitate the research objective for this work. More specifically, we determined that an 
enumerative taxonomy would be appropriate to model the features as measures of effectiveness 
as well as the relationships between such features.  
 
3.2 Data collection 
For data, we collected relevant published literature using primary research indices such as 
Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, NCLive, and so forth. We used keywords such as dynamic, 
honeypot, implementation, and architecture in various combinations. Further, we operationally 
excluded terms such as API, survey, or static in research titles to screen unrelated literature. 
Overall, we discovered 46 articles in total across our keyword and key phrase searches. These 
articles encompassed peer reviewed journal papers and conference proceedings. From this 
superset, we selected a subset of 20 articles based on the presence of enough honeypot design 
details. These details included technical descriptions, architecture or implementation diagrams, 
software code or pseudocode, and so forth. 
   
3.3 Limitations and Assumptions 
Foremost, this work is limited insofar as the findings are representative of what we were able to 
derive from existing literature. In other words, it is possible that complementary work exists but 
has not been published or has been published but is not available. We rationalize this limitation 
in that common features across honeypots ought to be open to common modes of measurement. 
 
Along those lines, this work is limited by the assumption that common features across various 
dynamic honeypot technology implies common means of measurement. While the expression of 
a feature may appear similar, or even identical between honeypots, we recognize variances in 
underlying programming may lead to variations in measurements. We have observed this, for 
example, in the way honeypots implement fingerprinting. However, we expect that properly 
tuned measures of effectiveness account for these variations. 
 
4. Results 
After analyzing the literature, we found four sets of measures that could be used across various 
dynamic honeypots in order to quantify their effectiveness in capturing adversarial activity. 
These four measures are: fingerprinting, data capture, deception, and intelligence. 
 
Fig. 1. Fingerprinting as the first measure of effectiveness category. 
 
We conceptualize fingerprinting as the ability for the honeypot to use a port scanning utility 
program to identify changes in its own service configuration as well as changes in the service 
architecture in the environment surrounding the honeypot. Fingerprinting exists as an 
independent measure, without any connection to the other measures, but is subordinate to the 
honeypot root (Fig. 1).  
 
There are many different approaches to fingerprinting (Table 1). While available tools such as 
nmap and xprobe2 are common, fingerprinting could manifest through any utility capable of 
interrogating services. Effectiveness is therefore measurable in terms of valid, accurate detection 
of services. Overall, fingerprinting exists as a key component in the taxonomy, as it is a 
prerequisite for other measures to be effective.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
Honeypot fingerprinting programs and command input examples 
Noise Level Programs Used Command Input 
low xprobe2 xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o <file> -X <ip> 
medium xprobe2 xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o <file> -X -T 1-1024,3306 -U 1-1024 <ip> 
medium-high nmap nmap -sT -sU -T3 -sV -O -oX <file> --host-timeout 200 <ip> 
high Xprobe2 + nmap Xprobe2 -r -m 2 -o <file> -X -T 1-1024,3306 -U 1-1024 <ip> 
nmap -sT -sU -T3 -sV -O -oX <file> --host-timeout 200 <ip> 
Note: adapted from Hecker 2012 
 
The second MoE is data capture. We conceptualize this as the ability for a honeypot to collect 
adversarial input with high fidelity. Moreover, we suggest quantification is possible through two 
subcomponents: capturing the commands an adversary runs in a honeypot and persisting the data 
beyond the malicious reach of adversaries (Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2. Data capture and subcomponents as the second measure of effectiveness. 
 
While not strictly included in the taxonomy, we suggest categorizing data during persistence 
according to three types: events, attack, and intrusion. More specifically, an event is any non-
harmful command an adversary may run on the system (e.g., ls, cd). Despite not inherently being 
malicious, these data may provide correlation points based on user interaction with the system. 
However, an attack constitutes a command that only a malicious user would execute. Building 
on attack is the most valuable type of command an adversary could run would be an intrusion, 
which we assert is any command that compromises the integrity of the system or interrupts 
normal, expected system function.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Deception and subcomponents as the third measure of effectiveness. 
 
Deception is the third MoE we extracted from the literature. Broadly, deception is how well an 
adversary is tricked into continued adversarial behavior. This is quantifiable by sojourn time or 
how long an adversary spends in our system in combination with the total number of commands 
executed (Fig. 3). A longer session time means the honeypot has elicited adversarial behavior 
effectively. Meanwhile, the other deception subcomponent is the number of commands that an 
adversary inputs to our honeypot. Not to be confused with data capture where we count the 
number of commands, here we conceive of total number of commands as a slope indicating the 
degree of deception. In other words, the more commands entered indicates expanding deceptive 
effectiveness. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Intelligence as the fourth measure of effectiveness. 
 
The modern era of honeypot research is demarcated by the presence of intelligence. Thus, we 
include intelligence as a MoE inclusive of the machine learning algorithms employed as the 
means of dynamism in the honeypot. There are a variety of honeypot machine learning 
implementations both in the context of algorithms as well as features rendered intelligent. For 
MoE, we specifically intend to measure the degree to which a dynamic honeypot can change and 
alter itself according to the incoming data capture and deceptive measures (Fig. 4). Ultimately, 
we organize the MoE according to levels (Table 2.). 
 
Table 2 
Levels of artificial intelligence present in honeypots 
Intelligence 
Level 
Significance 
5 
A Honeypot with a level 5 Intelligence would be able to recognize an 
adversary in its system and automatically be able to modify the environment 
around the adversary in order to more effectively deceive them.  
4 
A Honeypot at level 4 Intelligence would be able to automatically redeploy 
itself and harden its defenses after analyzing the logs from previous attacks. 
This would mean that the honeypot would become more difficult to crack as 
more people attack it, giving us data into more complex or stronger adversary 
strategies 
3 
An Intelligence level 3 Honeypot can recognize that an adversary is 
performing malicious commands in a vital area, and can eject the adversary 
or shut itself off and redeploy before the threat can do any actual damage to 
the system 
2 A honeypot with level 2 Intelligence can automatically re-deploy itself after it has been shut off without any changes to its initial configuration 
1 A Honeypot with an Intelligence level of 1 is a static honeypot  
 
5. Conclusions 
Honeypots attract adversaries by emulating operating systems, applications, and services with 
known vulnerabilities [2]. Unfortunately, honeypots are difficult to implement and maintain 
[4][5]. Dynamic honeypots are especially problematic in this manner [6]. On one hand, existing 
literature contains a plethora of suggestions as to how dynamic honeypots can be effectively 
deployed or managed. Yet, on the other hand there is little quantitative validation of 
effectiveness in this regard which leaves professionals, researchers, and educators without the 
means to differentiate between implementation or management modalities. 
 
For this reason, we investigated the potential for a standardized set of MoE related to common 
dynamic honeypot features. Twenty articles of primary research served as the foundation for our 
analysis. Based on this data set, we selected four quantitatively assessable characteristics of 
honeypots to measure effectiveness as honeypots and assembled the components into a 
taxonomy. The proposed model establishes this as fingerprinting, data capture, deception, and 
intelligence. Collectively, these should be successful in quantitatively assessing dynamic 
honeypots. 
 
5.1 Recommendations 
Accordingly, our recommendations and ideas for future work center on exploring this notion of 
should be successful in the context of the measure of effectiveness taxonomy. Based on our 
findings, we have three recommendations. 
 
First, we recommend the measures of effectiveness be employed as metrics for multiple 
honeypots currently being used in the industry, such as the Google Hack Honeypot, Honeyd, 
KFSensor, Cowrie, and so forth. A comparative analysis would provide insight into the 
effectiveness of honeypot solutions and provide instrument validation.  
 
Along those lines, the taxonomy may translate into a tool that automates data gathering for each 
of the measures. Furthermore, the tool might generate a score for the subject honeypot as well as 
for individual services within the honeypot. We recognize the inherent limitation however 
insofar as such a tool can only measure what the tool can access. Thus, we also suggest that a 
policy setting forth an appropriate set of honeypot API standards be constructed to aid future 
efforts. 
 
Another possible avenue of interest would be the use of the MoE model, assessment tool, and 
API policy, to guide the construction of a more robust honeypot framework. While it is not clear 
that another honeypot would be of benefit to researchers or practitioners, deeper understanding 
of adversary behavior and techniques would be beneficial. The new honeypot framework then 
must emphasize MoE elements. 
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